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I. INTRODUCTION
On a bright summer day in July 2011, a helicopter hummed through a blue
1
sky over the treetops in Tehama County, California. Below the helicopter,
narcotics agents armed with guns and machetes tore apart a large-scale marijuana
2
plantation, which contained thousands of marijuana plants. The agents were
participating in a tradition for California law enforcement: the summertime
3
eradication of millions of marijuana plants. Yet, in the fiscal year of 2010 to
2011, the state issued over ten-thousand medical marijuana cards that allow
4
cardholders to grow and use marijuana legally.
If asked whether marijuana cultivation is legal in California, an attorney will
5
likely answer with the lawyer’s standard refrain, “it depends.” Section 11358 of
the California Health and Safety Code establishes that cultivating marijuana is a
6
7
felony, but the law regarding cultivation is not so simple. In 1996, California
8
voters passed Proposition 215, known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA).

1. See Zusha Elinson, Budget Cuts Endanger State’s Marijuana Eradication Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29bccamp.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (indicating that the raid occurred on Wednesday of the same week that the article was published).
2. Id.
3. See id. (stating that the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting is a “predictable rite of summer” that
deploys law enforcement agents to cut marijuana crops).
4. California Medical Marijuana Identification Card By Volume, By County, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/Documents/MMP%20County%20FY%20
Card%20Count.FY2010_11.pdf%20May%2017.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2007).
5. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that cultivating
marijuana in California is a felony). But see id. § 11362.5 (West 2007) (codifying the Compassionate Use Act,
which created an affirmative defense to felony charges of marijuana cultivation). Both possession and
cultivation are illegal under federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(5) (2006).
6. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that people that are convicted of cultivating marijuana serve
their sentences in prison).
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (exploring the state of marijuana law in California).
8. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 11362.5 (West 2007).
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The CUA created an affirmative defense to the felony charge of cultivating
10
marijuana. Thus, a person who is charged with cultivating marijuana may be
11
12
acquitted under the CUA. Medical marijuana legislation followed the CUA.
In 2003, the California Legislature created the Medical Marijuana Program
13
(MMP). Unlike the CUA, the MMP offers immunity from arrest, but conditions
14
that immunity on the number of plants that a person may possess or cultivate.
Thus, even though section 11358 establishes that cultivating marijuana is a
15
felony, a person can grow limited amounts of marijuana without fear of arrest or
16
criminal charges. These apparently conflicting laws have created a confusing
legal environment where cultivating marijuana is a felony under most
17
circumstances, but is legal under some circumstances. In this confusion, three
distinguishable categories of marijuana cultivators have emerged: legal
18
cultivators, lesser illegal cultivators, and major illegal cultivators. This
Comment does not discuss the legal cultivators that the CUA and MMP protect.
Lesser illegal cultivators grow small amounts of marijuana, generally on private
property, sometimes for personal use; major illegal cultivators grow large
19
amounts of marijuana, often on public land for the purpose of sale. The
cultivation statute, however, does not differentiate between the two types of
20
illegal cultivators.

9. California voters passed the CUA (Proposition 215) with 55.58% of the vote. Michelle Patton, The
Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-End or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency?, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163,
166 (2010) (citing BILL JONES, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at viii
(1996)).
10. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (stating that Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code does
not apply to patients who cultivate marijuana and have physician approval to use it).
11. Id.
12. Medical Marijuana Program Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.77).
13. Id.
14. Compare id. (offering immunity from arrest when a person has a limited number of plants), with
HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (stating that Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code does not apply to
patients who cultivate medical marijuana and have physician approval to use it, but not offering immunity from
arrest).
15. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that people who are convicted of
cultivating marijuana serve their sentences in prison).
16. See id. § 11362.77 (West 2007) (allowing patients to possess up to six full-grown marijuana plants).
17. See Gerald Caplan, Symposium: Medical Marijuana: A Study of Unintended Consequences, 43
MCGEORGE L. REV. 127, 127 (2012) (“The legal status of medical marijuana is a legislative oddity, perhaps
unprecedented, in that state governments authorize possession and use of marijuana in knowing and clear
violation of federal criminal law.”).
18. These are the author’s own designations. The distinguishing characteristics will be discussed infra in
Parts III and IV.
19. This is a general distinction without clearly defined lines between lesser and major offenders. It
might be useful to consider a “large amount” of marijuana to be like obscenity in that it would be difficult to
define but a judge would know it when he or she saw it.
20. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that a person who cultivates
marijuana must serve a sentence in prison regardless of the amount of marijuana cultivated).
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Even though public opinion has shifted in support of medical marijuana, and
the law reflects this in many cases, the unlawful cultivation statute has remained
21
inflexible. Consider the following hypothetical, which demonstrates the
statute’s inflexibility: a college student who is not a qualified patient under the
CUA or MMP is caught growing five marijuana plants in his closet. At the same
time, a person employed by a drug cartel and not a qualified patient under the
CUA or MMP is caught growing five-thousand marijuana plants on public land.
If charged, both face the same charge and potential punishment under section
22
11358 of the Health and Safety Code.
This Comment questions the wisdom of such an inflexible law in light of the
legal status of marijuana, the increased social acceptance of medical use of
marijuana, and the increasing problem of large-scale plantations in California. It
first argues that the legislature should amend the cultivation statute to become a
“wobbler”—a punishment scheme allowing the crime to be charged as either a
23
24
felony or misdemeanor, instead of a “straight felony,” —a felony statute not
allowing for a misdemeanor charge and then recommends harsher sentences for
25
more egregious offenses. This two-pronged solution will give prosecutors
flexibility when they decide what charges to file, while giving courts flexible
sentencing guidelines. It will also account for the varied legal status of marijuana,
the increased social acceptance of the drug for medical purposes, and the
growing problem of large-scale plantations in California. Part II provides an
overview of California’s marijuana laws and notes how the cultivation statute has
not changed despite significant shifts in related areas of the law.
In Part III, this Comment discusses a partial solution to the problem of the
26
inflexible statute in light of social and legal change. This Part focuses first on
Assembly Bill (AB) 1017, introduced in 2011, which would have amended
section 11358 of the California Health and Safety Code, making the statute an
27
alternative felony misdemeanor, or “wobbler,” instead of a “straight felony.”
21. See infra Part II (exploring the relatively static history of the unlawful cultivation statute).
22. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that a person who cultivates marijuana must serve a sentence in
prison regardless of the amount of marijuana that they cultivate). In a real-life situation, the actual time served
may be different based on various enhancements, such as the presence of a firearm, prior convictions, and
further charges under possession for sale, which would have to be charged separately under Section 11359 of
the California Health and Safety Code; all things being equal, however, Section 11358 would apply the exact
same way. Id.
23. See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing AB 1017 and its likely effects had it been
passed).
24. Id.
25. See Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indicating that in criminal
law jargon, the offenses that a prosecutor can charge as either felonies or misdemeanors are known as
“wobblers”).
26. See infra Part III (discussing AB 1017 and the benefits it might have provided had it passed).
27. AB 1017, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as introduced on February 18, 2011, but not
enacted). See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing AB 1017 and the effect it would have had
on the unlawful cultivation statute’s sentencing formula).
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Part III looks at the benefits and costs of wobbler statutes. While the unlawful
cultivation statute should be a wobbler, this Comment further argues that AB
28
1017 was an incomplete solution to a larger problem.
Part IV explores why AB 1017 was an incomplete solution. This Part also
examines California’s experience with large-scale marijuana operations, focusing
on public safety and environmental dangers. Part IV then discusses how an
amended unlawful cultivation statute could deal with these kinds of problems.
Part V of this Comment proposes a new cultivation statute for California,
which would allow prosecutors and judges discretion to enforce community
standards while simultaneously tackling the rampant, large-scale grow operations
29
in California.
II. ROOTS OF UNLAWFUL CULTIVATION
This Part first defines unlawful cultivation and distinguishes it from the more
30
serious offense of manufacturing. It then explores how the unlawful cultivation
statute has remained static and inflexible in comparison to other aspects of
marijuana law, and illustrates some of the confusion resulting from recent
31
developments in marijuana law. Finally, this Part identifies various problems
that arise from the unchanged law concerning cultivation in the evolving field of
32
marijuana law.
A. Defining and Distinguishing Unlawful Cultivation
The unlawful cultivation statute contains several elements, any of which may
33
trigger an arrest: planting, cultivating, harvesting, drying, or processing.
California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that control over land on
34
which marijuana plants are growing creates an inference of cultivation. The
28. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text (concluding that AB 1017 was an incomplete
solution to a larger problem).
29. Id.
30. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that convicted
cultivators will serve time in state prison); id. § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in
prison and pay a fine); infra Part II.A (discussing the construction of the cultivation statute).
31. See infra Part II.B–C (discussing some of the confusion that has arisen due to the current statutory
framework).
32. See infra Part II.D (discussing these problems).
33. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358.
34. See California v. Vermouth, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 681 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1974) (“We also conclude
proof the marijuana plants were growing on the sun deck of the residence, coupled with evidence defendants
had control of the premises, was sufficient to support their conviction of cultivating marijuana.”). Vermouth is
the only published appellate decision on this point of law to date; however, it has been cited by a number of
unpublished cases. See, e.g., People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 87 (1978) (citing to Vermouth without
commenting on the Fourth District’s holding that control of the premises coupled with the presence of
marijuana plants was sufficient to convict for unlawful marijuana cultivation) (disagreed with on other
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“processing” element of section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code widens the
35
scope of the crime. In California v. Tierce, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that a person “who removes the leaves from marijuana plants in order to
render the leaves usable for smoking is engaged in processing the drug and thus
36
violates . . . section 11358.”
According to the unlawful cultivation statute, processing marijuana is
distinguishable from a more serious type of processing known as
37
manufacturing. While unlawful cultivation includes activities as simple as
trimming and preparing marijuana, it does not include the more complex
38
chemical processing found in section 11379.6 of the Health and Safety Code.
Section 11379.6 covers “every person who manufactures, compounds,
converts, produces, derives, processes, or prepares [marijuana], either directly or
indirectly by chemical extraction or independently by means of chemical
39
synthesis. . . .”
There are three noteworthy differences between sections 11358 and
40
11379.6. First, section 11379.6 includes a more specific category of activities,
41
focusing on the chemical process. That is, section 11379.6 includes words like
“manufacture” and “extraction,” whereas “processing” in section 11358 applies
42
to activities such as trimming plants and preparing leaves for smoking. Second,
43
the purpose of section 11379.6 focuses on the means of processing the drugs.
Unlike the unlawful cultivation statute, the purpose of section 11379.6 is to
protect the public from the potentially hazardous production process that involves

grounds); California v. Arbacauskas, 123 Cal. App. 4th 502, 862 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004) (finding sufficient
evidence for conviction for marijuana cultivation based on the satisfaction of the elements of cultivation in
Vermouth); California v. Sivichith, 2003 WL 549406 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. Feb. 26, 2003) (stating that a
person’s physical presence on the property or cohabitation with the owner does not amount to the kind of
control over land required to be sufficient evidence of marijuana cultivation under the standard in Vermouth);
California v. Haylock, 2009 WL 1026892 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Apr. 17, 2009) (finding that because the
defendant had control over the property where marijuana plants were growing, there was sufficient evidence to
find that the defendant was cultivating marijuana).
35. See California v. Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985) (stating that removing a
marijuana plant’s leaves in order to smoke them is a form of processing).
36. Id.
37. Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that convicted cultivators will serve time in prison),
with id. § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in prison and pay a fine).
38. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (stating that removing the leaves
of a marijuana plant constitutes processing according to the unlawful cultivation statute).
39. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6.
40. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (demonstrating the various differences between Penal
Code sections 11358 and 11379.6).
41. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6; see also id. § 11358 (encompassing a broad range of activities).
42. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 332–3 (discussing whether
removing leaves from marijuana plants constitutes processing marijuana).
43. See California v. Bergen, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 585 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008) (“[T]he Legislature
intended section 11379.6(a) to apply to . . . concentrated cannabis when produced through chemical
extraction.”).
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chemical extraction. Third, the punishment for chemical processing is more
45
severe. Section 11379.6 carries a punishment of three, five, or seven years, and
46
a fine of up to fifty-thousand dollars.
Section 11358 therefore does not generally represent the type of dangerous
conduct associated with drug production labs, like processing volatile
47
chemicals. The reach of the cultivation statute is limited to conduct such as
planting the seeds, watering and maintaining the plants, and drying and trimming
48
the plants to ready them for use. That has not changed substantively in forty
49
years.
B. Unlawful Cultivation Before and After Determinate Sentencing
In 1968, before the California Determinate Sentencing Act (CDSA), the
legislature enacted section 11530.1 of the Health and Safety Code, which
50
criminalized marijuana cultivation. The statute designated unlawful cultivation
51
of marijuana as a felony, but followed an indeterminate sentencing scheme. By
52
the early 1970s, the indeterminate sentencing scheme had begun to break down,
and in 1975, the California Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of reviewing
53
54
indeterminate sentences. In 1976, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 42,
55
the CDSA, a complex piece of legislation. The CDSA was a milestone in
California sentencing history, changing the sentencing paradigm applied
56
throughout the state.

44. Id.; see also HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (encompassing a broad range of activities).
45. Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in
prison and pay a fine), with id. § 11358 (stating that convicted cultivators will serve time in prison and pay a
fine).
46. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11379.6.
47. See Bergen, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 585 (“[T]he Legislature intended section 11379.6(a) to apply to . . .
concentrated cannabis when produced through chemical extraction.”); Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (stating that
removing the leaves of a marijuana plant constitutes processing according to the unlawful cultivation statute).
48. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 332–3 (concluding that removing the
leaves from marijuana constitutes processing).
49. See infra Part II.B (discussing the history of the unlawful cultivation statute).
50. See 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1465 § 2, at 2931–32 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11530.1) (stating
that violatins of the 1968 version of the unlawful cultivation were punishable by time in state prison for between
one and ten years); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 (repealed in 1972, redesignated as CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11358).
51. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 (repealed 1972, redesignated as HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358).
52. April Kestell Cassou & Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers
Game, 9 PACIFIC L.J. 5, 9–10 (1978).
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 17.
55. California Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139.
56. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 52, at 6.
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The CDSA changed the form of the unlawful cultivation statute, but it
57
remained a felony. While the CDSA did not change the sentences for
58
misdemeanors or “alternative dispositions for felonies, such as probation,” it
eliminated the sentencing guidelines that had previously existed in the unlawful
59
cultivation statute. The elimination of the sentencing guidelines shortened the
60
law to its current form : “Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or
processes any marijuana or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by
law, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of section
61
1170 of the Penal Code.”
C. The Current Legal Landscape
Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code includes the phrase “except as
otherwise provided by law,” which brings to mind the marijuana legislation of
62
the past two decades. Commentators have exhaustively discussed the last fifteen
63
years of marijuana initiatives and legislation in California. There are major
areas of focus in common in each account: the Compassionate Use Act of 1996
(CUA), the Medical Marijuana Program Act of 2003 (MMP), and the current
64
confusion concerning the future of marijuana law. This Part provides a brief
history of the CUA and the MMP, but the focus is on the overall trend toward
lenience.

57. Id. at 22 (noting the various portions of the law that changed); see also California Determinate
Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139 § 72, 5082 (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 11530.1) (renumbering
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 and removing the indeterminate
sentencing range).
58. Id.
59. See California Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, §§1–358, 5062–5178
(replacing the sentencing criteria that had previously existed in the state with new, determinate sentences for
violating numerous code sections).
60. Section 11358 of the California Health & Safety Code actually did not reference subdivision (h) of
section 1170 of the Penal Code. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). Although
the newest version of the statute references a different code section, it remains a felony conviction. Id.
61. Id. This is the more recent equivalent to the statute, which originally only referred to time in state
prison, rather than “subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Id. § 11358 (West 2007).
62. E.g., Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5) (comprising
the CUA, which is a provision of law that may cut off criminal liability for cultivating marijuana); Medical
Marijuana Program Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (establishing the Medical Marijuana Program, which may cut
off criminal liability for cultivating marijuana if the cultivator remains within certain guidelines).
63. E.g., Patton, supra note 9 (discussing the financial implications of legalizing marijuana); Michael
Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
417, 428–33 (2011) (discussing the federal response to various state’s marijuana legalization); Robert Weisberg,
Symposium, The Road to Legitimizing Marijuana: What Benefit at What Cost?, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1
(2012) (listing various topics related to marijuana laws).
64. Patton, supra note 9, at 166; Chris Lindberg, Room for Abuse: A Critical Analysis of the Legal
Justification for the Marijuana Storefront “Dispensary”, 40 SW. L. REV. 59 (2010).

1076

_09_STARR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:44 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
1. The Compassionate Use Act: The Seeds of Leniency and Budding
Confusion
65

California voters passed the CUA by initiative in 1996. In the Voter
Information Guide to the 1996 General Election, proponents of Proposition 215
argued that the proposition would help terminally ill patients and that marijuana
66
would still be illegal for non-medical use. The language of the proposition,
67
however, was not so restrictive. The CUA, outlined in section 11362.5 of the
Health and Safety Code, included the catch-all phrase “any other illness for
which marijuana provides relief” for those who did not suffer from the
68
69
enumerated ailments. The CUA’s language caused confusion.
In California v. Spark, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District
held that the CUA was not restricted to the “seriously ill” patients mentioned in
70
the language of the statute. It held that “seriously ill” was only prefatory
language, and it referred only to the specific diseases following immediately after
71
in the same subsection. The court reasoned that whether marijuana is an
72
appropriate treatment is a question for a physician to answer. It further held that
it was not up to a jury to decide whether a defendant asserting a CUA defense
73
was seriously ill. This determination was for a physician to make, and jurors
74
could not "second-guess" that decision. Although jurors have no say on the
efficacy of a physician’s determination, that fact does not protect cultivators from
75
arrest.

65. Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5).
66. Richard J. Cohen, et. al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA GENERAL
ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE/BALLOT PAMPHLET 60 (1996).
67. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007) (stating that a doctor can
prescribe marijuana for certain enumerated illnesses and “any other illness for which marijuana provides
relief”).
68. Id.
69. Tammy L. McCabe, It’s High Time: California Attempts to Clear the Smoke Surrounding the
Compassionate Use Act, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 545, 545 (2004) (“Since its enactment, uncertainties in the
[Compassionate Use] Act have become manifest, impeding law enforcement's ability to interpret and enforce
the law.”); see also, e.g., California v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 84–5 (2006) (exploring how the MMPA
retroactively affected cases in which defendants could not argue the CUA defense because they had been
convicted of transporting marijuana, and not of growing or using it); California v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 467
(2002) (discussing whether the CUA constitutes immunity from arrest and prosecution or only constitutes an
affirmative defense).
70. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 840, 846 (5th Dist. 2004).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (citing California v. Mower, 49 P.3d
1067, 1074–76 (Cal. 2002)) (“The CUA does not grant immunity from arrest for [marijuana possession] . . . .”).
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2. The Road to the Medical Marijuana Program
76

Efforts to clarify, extend, or implement the CUA initially met resistance. In
1999, the California Assembly failed to pass SB 848, which would have
“direct[ed] the state to develop and implement a plan for the safe and affordable
77
distribution of medical marijuana.” In 2001, SB 187 would have directed the
78
79
creation of a similar plan had it passed. SB 187 did not pass. In 2002, the
California Supreme Court held that the CUA “renders possession and cultivation
of marijuana noncriminal,” but that the CUA is only a defense in court and does
80
not protect patients or caregivers from arrest on marijuana cultivation charges.
Problems with the CUA persisted, including decreased availability of
marijuana for qualified patients, its construction with federal law, and “needless”
81
arrests and prosecutions. Confusion abounded regarding the legality of
82
marijuana use, possession, and cultivation. In 2003, SB 187 (2001) was revived
83
as SB 420.

76. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 8 (Cal. July
1, 2003) (stating the federal authorities tried to close local marijuana distributors).
77. SENATE THIRD READING, SUMMARY OF SB 848, at 2 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000); BILL HISTORY OF SB
848, (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_848_bill
_20001130_history.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
78. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, SB 187, at 2 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2001).
79. BILL HISTORY, supra note 76.
80. Mower, 49 P.3d at 1074–76. Ironically, the court relied on the language of the proponents of the
CUA found in the Voter Information Guide to limit the CUA. Id. at 1075–76.
81. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 12 (Cal. Jul. 1,
2003) (“Due to vague guidelines, patients and physicians have been subject to needless arrest and prosecution.”)
82. Thomas Elias, Marijuana Barely Illegal Now: Prop 215 Has Caused Complete Confusion, LODI
NEWS SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1997, at 4, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=hsM0AAAAIBA
J&sjid=SSEGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5454,7400745 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Medicinal Marijuana
Law Needs Some Tightening, LODI NEWS SENTINEL, July 17, 2000, at 5, available at http://news.google.
com/newspapers?id=hbM0AAAAIBAJ&sjid=OiEGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5296,1983746&dq=marijuana+confusion
s+law&hl=en (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“California’s groundbreaking medicinal marijuana law
is being used in other states as a model of how not to write a law to allow chronically ill patients to smoke the
drug.”); see also San Francisco Might Plant Its Own Marijuana Garden, UNION DEMOCRAT, July 24, 2002, at
5A, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=sy5ZAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Y0cNAAAAIBAJ&pg=
2215,3047262&dq=marijuana+identification+card&hl=en (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(documenting San Francisco’s own attempts to make marijuana available to users under the CUA model).
83. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 12 (Cal. July 1,
2003). The number 420, also expressed as 4:20 (time) and 4/20 (date), is associated with recreational marijuana
use. Ryan Grim, 420 Meaning: The True Story of How April 20 Became ‘Weed Day’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
20, 2010, 1:32 AM), http://www.huffington post.com/2010/04/20/420-meaning-the-true-stor_n_543854.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For an interesting look at its history and use, see id.
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3. The Medical Marijuana Program: A Failed Attempt to Clear the Haze
84

In 2003, the California Legislature passed SB 420, known as the MMP.
According to the Bill’s author, the MMP came as the result of a task force
85
convened by then-Attorney General Bill Lockyer. The California Department of
Public Health’s website states that the MMP was enacted to clarify and expand
86
the CUA.
The MMP created a voluntary identification system and outlined standards
87
for “qualified patient” status. The MMP extended the CUA by providing
immunity from arrest by police, but only for those who adhered to the qualified
88
patient standards. For instance, section 11362.77 of the Health and Safety Code,
which constitutes the MMP, states that “[a] qualified patient or primary caregiver
may also maintain no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per
89
qualified patient.” This limitation is not absolute, however, as section
90
11362.77(c) allows counties to increase the amounts previously listed. While
the CUA and MMP provide immunity for cultivating marijuana, neither has
91
affected how section 11358 applies to individuals other than qualified patients.
92
Other statutes have also evolved to reflect public opinion. On January 1,
2011, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law SB 1449, which
amended section 11357 of the Health and Safety Code regarding the possession
93
of marijuana. SB 1449 changed possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana
94
from a misdemeanor to an infraction. Thus, while the law grants immunity to

84. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7, 11362.71, 11362.715,
11362.72, 11362.735, 11362.74, 11362.745, 11362.755, 11362.76, 11362.765, 11362.77, 11362.775, 11362.78,
11362.785, 11362.79, 11362.795, 11362.8, 11362.81, 11362.82, 11362.83).
85. SENATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 6 (Cal.
Apr. 9, 2003).
86. See Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
PROGRAMS/mmp/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2013, 9:42 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that the MMP was enacted to address problems with the CUA and also to create a program to
give identification cards to qualified patients).
87. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.7(f) (West 2007).
88. See id. § 11362.77 (“A qualified patient or primary caregiver may possess no more than eight ounces
of dried marijuana per qualified patient . . . [and] no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per
qualified patent.”).
89. Id. § 11362.77(a).
90. Id. § 11362.77(c). To make matters more confusing, several counties use the name “Medical
Marijuana Program” for their own county-wide programs. Medical Marijuana Program Frequently Asked
Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/Pages/ MMPFAQ.aspx (last
modified Nov. 14, 2012, 9:59 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
91. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.715 (detailing how a person gains access to the MMP protections);
id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(a) (outlining generally the types of people to whom the CUA applies). But see id. § 11358
(providing no explicit exception except the phrase “except as otherwise provided by law.”).
92. 2010 Cal. Stat. ch. 708 (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 11357).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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qualified patients for cultivating marijuana and penalties for non-medical
possession have become more lenient, section 11358 does not reflect similar
95
change. This discrepancy contributes to the claim that California’s marijuana
96
law is in a state of chaos.
D. A Growing Problem: Mandatory Felony Charge for Lesser Offenses
97

Given the decriminalized status of cultivation in the context of the CUA and
98
the MMP, as well as the lowered sentence for non-medical possession of a small
99
amount of marijuana, Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code provides a
100
hefty and inflexible felony sentence. A mandatory felony charge for lesser
offenders is a problem because it lowers the chances of successful prosecution
101
and negatively affects public opinion of the legal system.
1. Cost Versus Benefit: A Victory for Lesser Offenders
Mandatory felony charges for lesser offenses decrease the likelihood of
102
successful prosecution. People weigh possible outcomes in terms of cost versus
benefit when engaging in any activity, be it crossing the street or playing the
103
lottery. In the context of unlawful cultivation of marijuana, cultivators weigh
the chances of getting caught and convicted against any benefits that they reap
104
from cultivating marijuana. This is a problem because “criminals prefer a small
105
chance of a big punishment to a big chance of a small punishment.” Thus, in
the context of crime, it is “better to double the odds of conviction than to double
95. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11362.77, 11358.
96. See Michael Vitiello, Symposium, Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We
Should Have Learned from Proposition 215, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 72 (2012) (detailing the confusion
resulting from the two programs in light of federal laws).
97. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5(b).
98. Id. § 11362.77.
99. Id. § 11357.
100. Id. § 11358.
101. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing these arguments).
102. See Steven E. Landsburg, Does Crime Pay?, SLATE (Dec. 9, 1999, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/arts/everyday_economics/1999/12/does_crime_pay.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(explaining that criminals prefer a low chance of a higher sentence to a high chance of a lower sentence); see
also Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 354 (2006)
(focusing on the fact that prosecutors can increase plea bargains even in situations where the defendant is
innocent). While that article deals with plea bargains for innocent defendants, the same principle would seem to
apply to guilty defendants who have a low chance of successful conviction. Id. Defendants with a higher chance
of acquittal and much to lose will take their chances. Id. When the odds are evened—when prosecutors have
discretion to provide lower sentences—the defendant will likely be more willing to accept a plea. Id.
103. See Landsberg, supra note 102 (using the lottery as an example of the average person’s cost-benefit
analysis).
104. See id. (applying the same cost-benefit reasoning to criminal activities).
105. Id.
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106

the severity of the punishment.” This point becomes more poignant in the
107
context of plea bargains.
In order to obtain convictions in the form of plea bargains, prosecutors rely
108
on their ability to offer a more favorable outcome to the defendant. In plea
bargaining, or the process of convincing the defendant to plead guilty in
exchange for lesser charges or penalties, prosecutors employ both the “carrot”
and the “stick.” The carrot represents a guaranteed lower sentence, and the stick
109
is the possibility of a higher sentence if the defendant loses at trial. In the case
of marijuana cultivation, prosecutors are not allowed to offer a misdemeanor
110
cultivation charge in exchange for a guilty plea. That is, prosecutors have no
111
“carrot” to offer the defendant.
The fact that defendants can potentially employ the CUA affirmative defense
112
makes matters more difficult for prosecutors seeking plea bargains. Plea
bargains are the most common means of obtaining convictions in the United
113
States. Under current law, a defendant would weigh any deal that the
prosecutor offers against the likelihood that they will prevail under the CUA,
114
which sweeps broadly. Given a defendant’s lack of incentive to plead guilty to
a “straight felony” and the presence of an arguable affirmative defense, plea
115
bargains will be more difficult to obtain in light of a CUA affirmative defense.

106. Id.
107. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. &
ECON. 353, 354 (2006) (focusing on the fact that prosecutors can increase plea bargains even in situations
where the defendant is innocent).
108. See id. (explaining that broader prosecutorial discretion to offer lower sentences has a positive
correlation to the number of plea bargains that can be obtained in cases where the defendant has a higher chance
of acquittal).
109. See generally id. at 355 (providing an analysis of how defendants approach plea bargains).
110. See generally NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
352–412 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the general legal framework surrounding the plea bargaining process).
Prosecutors may not offer a lower sentence than is legally required by law. Id. Any plea bargain a prosecutor
offered would have to be lowered by peripheral concerns like dismissing other pending charges in exchange for
the plea. Id.
111. COHEN ET. AL., supra note 110. In general, prosecutors will turn to any other charges, such as
possession for sale, or just possession in order to secure some kind of plea bargain. Id. Without charging those
extra offenses, there is no way to reduce Section 11358 to a misdemeanor. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11358 (West 2007).
112. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also supra notes 68 and accompanying text (discussing the CUA’s
catch-all provision, which may include people who do not suffer from serious illness).
113. See Bar-Gill & Gazal-Ayal, supra note 107, at 353 (“About 95 percent of all convictions in the
United States are secured with a guilty plea, most of them through plea bargaining.”).
114. See generally California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (“[T]he CUA provides an
affirmative defense to prosecution for the crimes of possession and cultivation.” (emphasis omitted)).
115. See id. (explaining that the CUA could not be limited by the requirements of the MMPA, and was
therefore still available to eligible defendants who did not qualify for protection under the MMPA); HEALTH &
SAFETY § 11358. The terms “straight felony” and “wobbler” do not appear in statutory language, but the a
wobbler is a crime that is punishable either by time in state prison or pursuant to California Penal Code Section
1170(h), which are felony sentences, or in the alternative, by up to one year in the county jail, a misdemeanor
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To make matters worse, prosecutors are dealing with a public that does not
necessarily associate cultivation of modest amounts of marijuana with criminal
116
behavior and the defendant’s own sense of fairness could make obtaining a plea
117
even more difficult.
2. The Pen Versus the Sword: A Net Loss for the Justice System
Charging lesser offenders with a straight felony has negative consequences
118
for the justice system. The heated debate concerning California’s marijuana
119
policy is becoming broader. The California Department of Public Health
website lists three patient advocacy groups as sources of information about
marijuana and the law: Americans for Safe Access (ASA), CA NORML (CAN),
120
and the Marijuana Policy Project (MPP). Each website provides legal updates,
121
advocates for broadened use, or blogs about experiences with marijuana law.
The fact that a government website funnels visitors to marijuana advocacy
groups may suggest a social acceptance of marijuana not previously present in
122
California. In 2010, Proposition 19, an effort to decriminalize recreational use
123
of marijuana in California, received over forty percent of the votes. Although it
did not pass, it represented a large number of Californians who do not view
marijuana use as criminal activity. With so many people supporting some degree
of marijuana use, harsh penalties for lesser offenses will work against law
124
enforcement. Ultimately, a law inconsistent with social expectations hurts the

sentence. California v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 96 (1997).
116. See infra Part II.D.2 (noting that the California Department of Public Health provides the public
with contact information to marijuana advocates on the Department’s website).
117. See Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 98 (2010) (stating that a defendant is still likely to reject a good deal if he or she
thinks it is unfair).
118. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that the success of the justice system depends on
the public’s agreement with its implementation).
119. See Vitiello, supra note 96, at, 63 (describing an argument concerning marijuana legalization heard
on NPR as uncivil and impassioned but ultimately tired and “unenlightening”).
120. Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
PROGRAMS/mmp/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2013, 9:42 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
121. ASA, http://www.safeaccessnow.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); CAL. NORML, http://www.canorml.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
122. Medical Marijuana Program, supra note 86.
123. Charles Cooper, Pot Law Hopes Dashed as California Votes Down Prop. 19, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3,
2010, 2:10 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20021581-503544.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
124. Id.; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the practical effects of treating
defendants inconsistently with social expectations).
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legal system because, to be effectively employed, society must trust that the
125
system is fair.
III. THE CARROT: EXPLORING A PARTIAL SOLUTION
This Part discusses one method of adapting the unlawful cultivation statute to
126
become one of California’s “wobblers.” It discusses the benefits of such a
statute in cases of lesser offenders, as well as possible pitfalls such a statute
127
would face. Ultimately, this Part concludes that a wobbler statute would deal
with small-scale illegal marijuana cultivators, but would not be a complete
128
solution to California’s problems.
A. Wobbling Toward a Solution
In 2011, the California Assembly considered AB 1017, which would have
amended section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code, turning it into an
129
130
alternative misdemeanor felony statute, or “wobbler.” Upon introduction of
the bill, the author commented that the amended law would give prosecutors
“discretion to charge either a misdemeanor or felony for marijuana cultivation,”
131
which would allow the district attorneys to enforce community standards. The
author also cited the resources needed to prosecute felonies rather than
132
misdemeanors and the overcrowded condition of prisons in California. On the
other hand, the author stated, the change in law would not offer a “free pass” to

125. See Leif H. Carter & Thomas F. Burke, REASON IN LAW 32 (8th ed. 2010) (stating that social
values like stability and equality are important to an effective judiciary).
126. See infra Part III.A (discussing AB 1017).
127. See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of wobbler statutes in the context of
marijuana cultivation).
128. See infra Part III.D–E (exploring some reasons why simply creating a wobbler statute would not
constitute a complete solution).
129. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal.
May 3, 2011) (summarizing the effect of the proposed law).
130. See Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indicating that in criminal
law jargon, the offenses that a prosecutor can charge as either felonies or misdemeanors are known as
“wobblers”).
131 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2 (Cal. May 3,
2011).
132. Id. The author expressed this concern before implementation of Assembly Bill 109 (AB 109). Id.
The California Legislature passed AB 109 in response to the Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Plata. See 131
S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (holding that overcrowding in Californian prisons violated the Eight Amendment). The
desired effect of this legislation is to reduce the number of non-serious, non-violent, and non-sex offenders in
state prison, instead sending them to serve felony sentences in county jail. Public Safety Realignment, CAL.
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). For an exhaustive legislative analysis of AB 109, see Steven Thomas Fazzi, Comment,
A Primer on the 2011 Corrections Realignment: Why California Placed Felons Under County Control, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 423 (2013).
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anyone, but merely the possibility of a lesser charge for “backyard grows and
133
trimmers.”
In support of AB 1017, the California Public Defenders Association argued
that the change would “untie the hands” of district attorneys, aligning the
unlawful cultivation statute with “a more consistent and sensible sentencing
134
scheme.” Citing the discrepancy between Health and Safety Code sections
11357 (possession) and 11358 (cultivation), the Mendocino County District
Attorney argued that it makes no sense to prosecute a person differently for the
same amount of marijuana just because one person possessed marijuana that was
135
still on the plant.
B. The Benefits of Wobblers
In California, many crimes may be charged or sentenced as a misdemeanor
or a felony. This determination is based on the language of the statute, how the
136
prosecutor files the complaint, and how the court determines the sentence. The
statutory language that allows a crime to be charged as a wobbler is contained in
137
the California Penal Code. Only when a statute explicitly allows such a
sentencing scheme are prosecutors allowed to exercise discretion whether to
138
charge a felony or a misdemeanor for violation of that statute.
Under a wobbler statute, prosecutors and judges have discretion to reduce the
139
possible sentence. When a prosecutor charges a wobbler, that prosecutor may
140
charge it either as a felony or a misdemeanor. If the prosecutor charges the
wobbler as a misdemeanor, any resulting conviction will be a misdemeanor
141
conviction. On the other hand, if the prosecutor charges the wobbler as a
felony, courts still have discretion to reduce the felony sentence to a
142
misdemeanor sentence. Thus, wobbler statutes allow prosecutors and judges to
133. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May
3, 2011).
134. Id. at 3.
135. Letter from C. David Eyster, Mendocino County District Attorney, to Assembly Member Tom
Ammiano (May 1, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
136. California v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1997).
137. PENAL § 17(b).
138. See California v. Lara, 202 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A sentencing court has no discretion to
deviate from the punishment prescribed by statute.”); see also Loren L. Barr, Comment, The “Three Strikes
Dilemma”: Crime Reduction at any Price?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 107, 117–18 (1995) (stating that if a
prosecutor charges the “wobbler” crime as a felony, the trial court has the discretion to reduce it to a
misdemeanor).
139. Barr, supra note 138, at 117–18.
140. Id. at 118.
141. Id.
142. See California v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 648 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that courts may
reduce crimes to a misdemeanor); Barr, supra note 138, at 118 (“If the prosecutor charges the wobbler as a
felony, the court has a number of methods at its disposal to reduce the crime to a misdemeanor.”).
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143

uphold community standards, just as comments on AB 1017 suggested.
Furthermore, turning section 11358 into a wobbler may increase the number of
144
plea bargains and raise conviction rates.
C. The Drawback of Wobblers
One drawback to the wobbler is that it may lead to uneven application of
145
California law. Critics of wobbler statutes argue that prosecutors may abuse
146
their discretion. As one commentator suggests, a prosecutor’s discretion may
include otherwise impermissible considerations, such as the prosecutor’s own
ideals, prejudices, or feelings against certain classes of people, or even the
147
temptation to lighten their workload. In short, the resulting prosecution will
148
differ more because of geographical location than anything else.
D. To Wobble or Not to Wobble: A Wobbler Statute Would Be Consistent with
Marijuana Law
In the context of marijuana cultivation, a wobbler statute would be consistent
149
with the overall legal scheme of medical marijuana. Section 11362.77(c) of the
California Health and Safety Code provides that individual counties “may retain
or enact medical marijuana guidelines allowing qualified patients or primary
150
caregivers to exceed the state limits . . . .” In fact, California counties differ in
151
the amounts of marijuana one may possess under the auspices of the MMP.
Some counties adhere to the state-mandated minimum, whereas others greatly
152
increase the minimum. Thus, different treatment based on geographical
143. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May
3, 2011).
144. See Loren Gordon, Where to Commit a Crime if You Can Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the
Time: The Constitutionality of California’s Wobbler Statutes as Applied in the State Today, 33 SW. L. REV. 497,
506 (2004) (indicating that prosecutors use wobbler statutes to obtain guilty or no contest plea bargains); see
also supra Part II.D.1 (exploring how mandatory higher sentences can make obtaining convictions more
difficult).
145. See generally Gordon, supra note 144, at 503, 505 (stating that prosecutors may inject their own
personal ideals into their decisions, and policies differ between each prosecutor’s office).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 503.
148. See id. (“The ensuing result is that the same crime may be prosecuted and punished differently
depending on the jurisdictional forum rather than any number of permissible objective factors.”).
149. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77(c) (West 2007) (stating that counties may choose to
allow how much medical marijuana a qualified patient may have in excess of the amount provided by the
statute). While critics argue for a systemic change reducing prosecutorial discretion, this Comment takes the
system at face value.
150. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.77(c).
151. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 31 n.41 (2005).
152. Id.; see also Caplan, supra note 17, at 132 (“California counties also exhibit great variation as to
how much marijuana a patient may possess.”).
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location is implicit in the MMP. Creating a wobbler statute would, consistent
with section 11362.77 of the California Health and Safety Code, allow counties
153
to treat offenders consistent with community standards. The California District
Attorneys Association (CDAA), the California Police Chiefs Association
(CPCA) and the California Narcotics Officers’ Association (CNOA), however,
154
argued against making section 11358 a wobbler.
The CNOA argued against AB 1017 on the grounds that decreased penalties
for marijuana cultivators “amounts to an improvement” in the situations of those
155
who have invaded the market with illegal activities.
Looking at the
characteristics of wobbler statutes, at least in some cases, the CNOA was
156
correct. Because there would be no statutory guideline for how to apply the
new wobbler, it is possible for a district attorney to charge a defendant with only
157
a misdemeanor 11358, regardless of the size or location of the cultivation. This
means that it would be possible to charge a person with a misdemeanor who had
grown multiple thousands of marijuana plants. Thus, turning the unlawful
cultivation statute into a wobbler would fail to address larger plantations and the
158
valid concern that the CNOA expressed in its opposition to AB 1017.
E. An Incomplete Solution
159

The legislature did not pass AB 1017. However, it would have been an
incomplete solution because it only addressed two of the issues with the current
cultivation statute: low probability of conviction and inconsistency with social
160
norms. A better solution to the problem would also address the CNOA’s
concerns.

153. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.77(c); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May 3, 2011).
154. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 3 (Cal.
May 3, 2011) (setting out the CNOA’s objections to AB 1017 and listing the CDAA, the CPCA, and the CNOA
as opponents to AB 1017).
155. Id.
156. See generally id. (failing to set any statutory guidelines for application of a misdemeanor charge);
California v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 648 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that courts may use their discretion
to reduce felony crimes to misdemeanors).
157. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal.
May 3, 2011) (explaining that the misdemeanor charge could be used for lesser offenders); see also AB 1017,
2011 Leg., 2011–20012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as introduced on February 18, 2011, but not enacted) (providing no
restriction for offering a misdemeanor charge to large-scale cultivators or those who cultivate in specific areas
of the state).
158. Id.
159. BILL HISTORY OF AB 1017, (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/asm/ab_1001-1050/ab_1017_bill_20120201_history.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
160. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May
3, 2011); see also Gordon, supra note 144, at 506 (alluding to the fact that prosecutors use wobbler statutes to
increase the chances of conviction by offering plea bargains).
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IV. FINDING A MORE COMPLETE SOLUTION
This Part explores in greater detail the problems that result from large-scale
161
illegal marijuana cultivation and use of public lands for such cultivation.
Specifically, this Part illustrates how violence and marijuana cultivation are often
linked, and examines the various ways illegal marijuana cultivation contributes to
162
destruction of the environment. Finally, this Part explores some economic
implications of regulating marijuana cultivation and concludes that such
163
regulation could help deter larger, more environmentally harmful cultivation.
A. Unlawful Cultivation as a Social Harm
Marijuana cultivation may be legal under certain circumstances, but unlawful
cultivation is still linked with various social harms, particularly violence and
164
environmental degradation. This section explores these social harms to better
define policy goals and formulate a new cultivation statute.
1. Unlawful Cultivation and Violence
In September 2010, the Fresno County Board of Supervisors, citing recent
violence, passed an emergency initiative to ban the outdoor cultivation of
165
medical marijuana. In December 2011, the City of Fresno passed a similar ban
after a man was killed trying to steal marijuana from an outdoor cultivation
166
site. In January 2012, the city extended the ban, asserting that outdoor
167
marijuana cultivation led to violent crime.
Fresno is not the only California city that has seen violence linked to
168
marijuana cultivation. Evidence from multiple counties suggests that violence

161. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing violence and environmental degradation).
162. See infra Part IV.A. (summarizing some of the problems with unlawful marijuana cultivation on
public land).
163. See infra Part IV.B (noting that the CAMP program might have created more demand for marijuana
and that the legislature could take a different approach to reduce demand).
164. See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (discussing the problems that are linked to marijuana cultivation).
165. Gene Haagenson & Tommy Tran, Fresno County Passes Temporary Ban on Outdoor Marijuana
Gardens, ABC LOCAL (Sept. 4, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=7668091 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
166. Gene Haagenson, Fresno City Council Bans Outdoor Marijuana Cultivation, ABC LOCAL (Dec.
15, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=8468085 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
167. Gene Haagenson, Fresno Extends Ban on Outdoor Marijuana Growing, ABC LOCAL (Jan. 26,
2012), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=8520661 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
168. E.g., Diana Marcum, Central Valley’s Booming Medical Marijuana Crop Draws Violence, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/02/local/la-me-pot-crop-20101003 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the heightened level of violence associated with marijuana cultivation); Sean
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associated with marijuana cultivation is a serious problem California. In April
2009, law enforcement officials in Humboldt County responded to a home
170
171
invasion. The target was a marijuana “grow house.” While officials suggested
that violence of this kind goes unreported due to the uncertain legality of growing
marijuana, they cited eight occasions between April 2008 and April 2009 in
172
which violence was used against marijuana cultivators. Elsewhere, similar
episodes have occurred; for example, a gang-related home-invasion in Lindsay,
173
California resulted in death. Local marijuana vendors have also recognized the
174
violence surrounding marijuana cultivation.
One of the salient features of large-scale marijuana grow operations is the
175
presence of firearms. In September 2011, law enforcement officials raided
multiple large-scale grow operations throughout California, many of which also
176
yielded firearms. In a raid in San Mateo County that yielded over 5,000
177
marijuana plants, law enforcement officers found a loaded .22 caliber rifle. In
the same month, a raid in Humboldt County that yielded over one-million
178
dollars’ worth of marijuana also yielded three firearms. An investigation in
Napa County that began in September 2011 and concluded in October of the
same year yielded a .22 caliber sawed-off rifle, a .22 caliber handgun, five
179
shotguns, and four other rifles. As Fresno’s police chief told the Fresno City
Council in January 2012: “The people that are protecting those groves have
180
armed themselves with firearms.” To make matters worse, law enforcement

Garmire, Growing Violence: Marijuana Gardens Are Robbery Targets Throughout Humboldt County, TIMESSTANDARD (Apr. 19, 2009, 1:29 AM), http://www.times-standard.com/localnews/ci_12177281 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
169. E.g., supra notes 167–168 (exploring violence linked with cultivation); infra notes 170–171, 174–
177 and accompanying text (detailing more violence associated with cultivation).
170. Garmire, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Marcum, supra note 168.
174. See California v. Colvin, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 859 (Ct. App. 2012) (“Patients are allowed no
more than one ounce of marijuana in one day, and, to minimize the chance of crime, each Holistic establishment
has no more than two to three pounds of marijuana at any time.”).
175. E.g., infra notes 177–180 (discussing the firearms that police found during various raids).
176. See generally id. (demonstrating a link between firearms and cultivation).
177. More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., ABC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2011), http://abclocal.
go.com/kgo/ story?section=news/local/peninsula&id=8378328 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
178. Press Release, Humboldt Cnty. Dist. Att’y, Large Scale Marijuana Cultivation Operation
Discovered Near Dinsmore (Oct. 28, 2011), available at https://co.humboldt.ca.us/distatty/pdf/PR.Criminal.
Dinsmore.MJRaid.Subm.2011.1028.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
179. Napa Special Investigations Bureau, Marijuana Busts Yield Towering Plants, 19 Arrests, NAPA
VALLEY PATCH (Oct. 14, 2011), http://napa.patch.com/articles/photos-show-towering-super-pot-plants (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
180. Haagenson, Fresno Extends Ban on Outdoor Marijuana Growing, supra note 167.
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officials have cited violent Mexican drug cartels as the culprits behind large-scale
181
marijuana grow operations.
2. Unlawful Cultivation and Environmental Degradation
Large-scale marijuana cultivation damages California’s environment and
182
natural resources. In Yosemite National Park, for instance, where sixty rangers
patrolled over one-thousand square miles as of 2009, “[c]ultivating marijuana . . .
has noticeably affected the water quality, animal life, and health and safety of the
183
public.” In addition to the danger to wildlife and hikers, large-scale marijuana
cultivation negatively affects California during drought years by diverting
184
precious water resources.
In 2007, rangers in Yosemite National Park located a marijuana grow
operation that included over seven-thousand plants, herbicides, pesticides, and a
185
complex irrigation system. The National Park Service reported that substantial
186
“natural resource destruction” resulted from the operation. Cultivators divert
natural water sources, even damming streams, to achieve effective irrigation
187
systems. Artificial irrigation systems lead to erosion of natural habitat, which
188
affects wildlife.
Large-scale marijuana cultivators harm wildlife indirectly through detriment
to their habitat, and directly by killing animals, including endangered species,
189
through the use of chemicals or by poaching. Marijuana cultivators use
190
pesticides and herbicides to keep their marijuana plants healthy. Illegal
marijuana cultivators will often use herbicides and pesticides that have been
191
banned in California. Further, cultivators may use generators, which can leak

181. Tim McGirk, Mexican Drug Cartels Set Up Shop in California Parks, TIME (Aug. 22, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917547,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
182. Jessica Intrator et al., Note, Student Review of Selected Panels at the California State Bar’s 2009
Environmental Law Conference at Yosemite, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 227, 228 (2009).
183. Id. at 227–28.
184. Jennifer Lance, Marijuana Plantations Compound California Drought, BLUE LIVING IDEAS (Oct.
7, 2009), http://bluelivingideas.com/2009/10/07/marijuana-plantations-compound-california-drought/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
185. Marijuana Gardens Raided in Yosemite National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 14, 2007),
http://www.nps.gov/yose/parknews/marijuana2007.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
186. Id.
187. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228.
188. See id. (stating that the grower’s measures to divert water lead to negative consequences for fish
and any habitat that the fish use to spawn).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Nancy Upham, Be Safe on Our Public Lands: What to Do if You Encounter a Marijuana
Cultivation Site, U.S. FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/alerts-notices/
?cid=stelprdb5324909 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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fuel into the soil and water supply. Some cultivators leave hazardous materials,
193
such as sewage and trash. They create a danger of wildfire through the use of
194
chemicals, generators, and cooking fires. Aside from the indirect effect on
195
wildlife, cultivators may poach wildlife. In Yosemite, cultivators kill animals
for a variety of purposes. They “hunt[] deer for meat, they kill[] bear to hang as a
deterrent to other wildlife, and even poach[]” endangered species, such as the
196
ring-tail cat, to keep “for a souvenir.”
Even on the federal level, agencies recognize the deleterious environmental
197
effects of marijuana cultivation. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
stated that “[o]utdoor marijuana cultivation . . . has negative environmental
198
effects.” The paper cited the same kinds of problems that have plagued
Yosemite National Park: “chemical contamination and alteration of watersheds;
diversion of natural water courses; elimination of native vegetation; wildfire
hazards; poaching of wildlife; and disposal of garbage, non-biodegradable
199
materials, and human waste.” In California, the problem is so prevalent that the
United States Forest Service has printed warnings in the Mendocino National
Forest that instruct hikers and visitors on what to do if they stumble upon a
200
marijuana grow operation.
B. Trends in Unlawful Cultivation
Legislative action can affect the market for marijuana just as it affects any
201
other market. Because the market for marijuana encompasses not just the sale
and use, but the production of marijuana, the legislature should consider the
202
economic implications of its choice to amend the cultivation statute.

192. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228.
193. Upham, supra note 191.
194. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228.
195. Marijuana Gardens Raided, supra note 185.
196. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228.
197. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics
Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Gil Kerlikowske, Dir., Off. of Nat’l Drug Control).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics
Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Congressman Mike Thompson, Representative, Cal. 1st Cong. Dist.).
201. See infra Part IV.B.1–2 (noting that the CAMP program might have created more demand for
marijuana, and that the legislature could take a different approach to reduce demand).
202. Id.
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1. Some Basic Economic Observations: Eradication Efforts and the Price
of Marijuana
In order to define policy goals for controlling illegal marijuana cultivation, it
is useful to examine the economic history of marijuana cultivation. Factors to
consider include the number of plants grown and their location in relation to the
203
cost of marijuana and California’s legal stance regarding marijuana cultivation.
At first glance, it is clear that illegal marijuana cultivation has risen significantly
204
since the advent of the CUA and MMP.
205
In 1983, amid the war on drugs and during a time that NORML calls its
206
darkest days, California saw the creation of the Campaign Against Marijuana
207
Planting (CAMP). CAMP, which ceased operations when the legislature cut its
208
funding in 2012, was a “unique multi-agency law enforcement task force
209
managed by the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement.” It consisted of federal, state,

203. Basic economic principals tell us that the number or amount of a particular product produced, in
this case marijuana, affects the market for that product. See Matt Johnson, Economic Basics: Supply and
Demand, SOPHIA (last visited Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.sophia.org/economic-basics-supply-and-demandtutorial (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (demonstrating how higher supply correlates to lower
demand). California’s interest in public safety requires it to concern itself with the location of marijuana
cultivation cites, and Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code makes it clear that cultivation should be
considered within the broader scheme of marijuana statutes. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West
2007) (alluding to legal marijuana cultivation by including the language “except as otherwise provided by
law.”); see also Part IV.A (exploring the public safety hazards associated with mariuana cultivation).
204. See CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING, CAMP FINAL REPORT 1 (1983), available at
http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP.htm [hereinafter CAMP FINAL REPORT] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the history of the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP)).
205. Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” in 1971. See Frontline, Thirty Years of America’s
Drug War, PBS (last visited June 25, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline /shows/drugs/cron/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing a timeline outlining many of the more significant events in the
“War on Drugs”).
206. See Marijuana Law Reform Timeline: NORML’s and Marijuana’s Law Reform Timeline in
America, NORML (last visited June 25, 2013), http://norml.org/about/item/marijuana-law-reform-timeline (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the time period from 1980 to 1988 as “NORML’s darkest days
politically and financially with most of the political efforts directed to” lobbying and organizing).
207. See CAMP FINAL REPORT 1, supra note 204 and accompanying text.
208. Julie Johnson, Annual Pot Eradication Program Scaled Back, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Jul. 24,
2012), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20120724/ARTICLES/120729742 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
209. Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, OFF. ATTY. GENERAL, http://ag.ca.gov/bne/camp.php (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also CAMP FINAL REPORT, supra note 204
(listing all the agencies involved under federal and state categories). In CAMP’s inception year, it included the
following federal agencies: Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Forest
Service; U.S. Marshal’s Service; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Customs; Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Bureau of Indian Affairs; and the following state agencies: Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement;
Western States Information Network; Office of Emergency Services; California Department of Forestry;
California Highway Patrol; and California Army National Guard. Id.
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210

and local agencies with the overarching objective of significantly diminishing
211
unlawful cultivation of marijuana in California. The main focus of CAMP’s
work was decreasing cultivation and trafficking, with the goal of “increasing
public and environmental safety by removing marijuana growers from public and
212
private lands.”
By the late 1980s, critics claimed that organizations such as CAMP had only
213
spurred the evolution of the marijuana market. Critics of CAMP in particular
claimed that efforts to eradicate the market by targeting large grows have merely
caused marijuana farmers to establish “guerilla patches,” which are harder to see
using aerial surveillance techniques, and have also caused them to move their
214
operations to public lands. Critics also point to the increase in indoor grow
215
operations.
CAMP’s data does show a lower number of eradicated plants after 1989, but
216
only up to the mid-nineties. According to CAMP, the raids between 1993 and
1996 yielded approximately the same number of plants as the few that had been
217
seized in 1983, the year CAMP was organized. Starting in 1997, however, the
data shows a consistent increase in the number of plants seized per year, from
218
over 100,000 in 1997 to over 1.6 million in 2006. In 2009, “California
219
produced more outdoor-grown marijuana . . . than Mexico,” most of it grown
220
on public land. One report indicates that the potential amount of marijuana
221
produced in California totals as much as 155,042 metric tons per year. The data

210. See CAMP FINAL REPORT, supra note 204, at 1 (including the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration; U.S. Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Forest Service; Office of National Drug Control
Policy; U.S. National Park Service; Governor’s Office of Emergency Services; California National Guard;
California Department of Fish and Game and California State Parks, as well as police departments and sheriff’s
offices).
211. Id.
212. Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, supra note 209.
213. James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and Analysis of a Failed
Policy, 21 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 459 (1988).
214. Id. at 459–60.
215. Id. at 460. CAMP came under fire for other reasons as well. See Gayle J. Mayfield, Comment,
Florida v. Riley: The Beginning or the End of “Big Brother”?, 12 CRIM. JUST. J. 53, 59–60 (1990) (describing
the use of injunctions against CAMP in the context of search and seizure law).
216. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, HUMBOLDT ST. UNIV. (2006),
available at http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP/CAMP2009.pdf (illustrating a decrease of over
60,000 plants from 1989 to 1990, but then a steep increase in eradicated plants after 1996) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA, CENTRAL VALLEY CAL. HIDTA, 3 (2010).
220. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, HUMBOLDT ST. UNIV. (2009),
available at http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(revealing that of 4,463,917 plants seized in 2009, 3,397,016 (76%) of them were seized on public land).
221. MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 219, at 4.
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appears to correlate with developments of recent marijuana laws. The
correlation suggests that California’s legal stance on marijuana has an effect on
illegal production, but a brief look at the economy of marijuana also helps
explain these numbers.
One outdoor marijuana plant yields two-hundred grams, or seven ounces, of
223
224
marijuana. An indoor plant yields one-half that. Between 2001 and 2005, the
225
cost of one gram of marijuana averaged approximately six dollars. Thus, where
an indoor home cultivation of twenty plants would yield approximately twelvethousand dollars’ worth of marijuana, a larger cultivation of one-thousand plants,
outdoors on public land, would yield over one-million dollars’ worth of
226
marijuana. The cost, however—a possible felony conviction—would be the
227
same. Furthermore, CAMP is no longer functioning and eradication efforts on
228
public land will be scaled back. Thus, with a single, inflexible penalty for the
cultivation for any amount of marijuana, the system has incentivized large-scale
229
cultivation by keeping the penalties the same for higher amounts of marijuana.
2. Using the Law to Influence the Cultivation Economy
Whether shifting large cultivation operations to farmland, or reducing the
size of individual cultivation sites, California’s marijuana statutes have affected
cultivation economy, which inevitably affects the cultivators’ behavior. For
230
instance, there has been a recent increase in farmland utilization. While

222. Compare 2009 STATISTICS, supra note 216, to the timing of the CUA, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §
11362.5 (West 2007) (enacted in 1996) and MMPA, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.71 (West 2007) (enacted
in 2003) (showing a steady increase in marijuana eradication after 1997 and a sharp increase after 2003).
223. Jon Gettman, Marijuana Production in the United States, BULLETIN OF CANNABIS REFORM 7 (Dec.
2006), available at http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport_2006.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
224. Id.
225. See id. at 9 (listing prices ranging from $5.91 to $6.14). These numbers only approximate the value
of marijuana, and like any other products, can fluctuate with time and market forces. See Lindy Stevens, How Is
the Street Value of Marijuana Determined, MICHIGAN DAILY (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.michigandaily.com/
content/how-street-value-marijuana-determined (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing a rough
calculus performed by the Drug Enforcement Agency to determine drugs’ street value). Based on DEA
calculations, the price of marijuana can fluctuate significantly. Id.
226. See id. (showing prices for one gram of marijuana for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005
as $6.14, $6.79, $5.83, $5.47, and $5.91 respectively).
227. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007) (criminalizing cultivation of marijuana
irrespective of the number of plants).
228. Johnson, supra note 208.
229. See Landsburg, supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating that criminals weigh the potential
cost of crime with the potential benefits that they may reap from the crime).
230. See Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l
Narcotics Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Sen. Caucus on Int’l
Narcotics Control) (citing an increase in farmland utilization and a decrease from seventy grows discovered on
public land to thirty between 2009 and 2011).
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federally-led efforts to eradicate marijuana plantations continue, laws like the
231
CUA and MMPA have contributed to the shift to farmland use in California.
The proposed statute would support small-scale cultivation and discourage large232
scale cultivation on public lands, further expediting the shift.
Another example of a legal change that has caused an economic shift is the
recent downturn in marijuana prices. The recent legal shift to regulated marijuana
appears to have dealt a blow to illegal marijuana growers all over the state by
233
lowering the cost of marijuana. Because Californians are now able to grow
234
their own marijuana legally, demand is lower than in previous years. Because
235
the demand for marijuana is lower, the cost of marijuana has dropped. In some
areas of California that rely heavily on marijuana cultivation, the drop in prices
236
has been catastrophic for the local economy. Since supply is higher than
237
demand, growers are forced to expand production to realize the same profits. In
the short term, large increases in production may have caused the rise in the
238
number of marijuana plants that authorities eradicated on public land.
The
proposed statute should address this escalation, something AB 1017 failed to do.
The breadth of possible economic responses to making section 11358 a
wobbler underlines the incompleteness of AB 1017. In this economic
environment, amending the cultivation statute to become a wobbler may have
any of the following consequences: the price of marijuana would decrease more,
leading to even larger plantations; a larger number of plantations throughout the
state in light of the possibility of lower penalties; or there could be no noticeable
239
effect. Ideally, a wobbler would lower the price of marijuana further, making
large-scale operations too costly in light of the chance of losing the entire crop to
231. Sasha Khokha, Where the Marijuana Grows: Feds Target Landowners, NPR (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141690170/where-the-marijuana-grows-feds-target-landowners (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that marijuana growers in California largely ignore federal authorities
because of California marijuana law).
232. E.g., id. (arguing that eradication programs like that presented by CAMP are ineffective).
233. Michael Montgomery, Plummeting Marijuana Prices Create a Panic in Calif., NPR (May 15,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126806429 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
234. See id. (discussing the increase in supply in the California marijuana market, which also tends to
suggest a decreased demand).
235. See Id. (exploring the effects of increased production of marijuana in California, including a decline
in marijuana prices and consequently lower profits for suppliers).
236. Id. (“California’s pot economy is transforming, and it’s starting to resemble a real commodities
market where only big players can compete.”).
237. Id.
238. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, supra note 220 (showing an
upward trend in spite of the felony charge under Section 11358).
239. As Professor Caplan has demonstrated, shifts in marijuana law have produced unintended results;
these are merely some of the more likely results and do not represent an exhaustive list of the possibilities. See
Caplan, supra note 17 (discussing consequences of recent marijuana legislation such as increased use of
marijuana by younger people, massive increases in the number of qualified patients, and explosive
commercialization of the marijuana market).
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240

eradication. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the possibility that lower
penalties might encourage would-be cultivators to go into business, even
providing a friendly market for outside organizations such as drug cartels to
241
exploit. Based on the deleterious consequences of large-scale operations,
particularly on public land, the latter possibility should be avoided at all costs,
242
hence the CNOA’s opposition to AB 1017. In order to prevent the possible
negative consequences, the proposed statute should increase penalties for largescale cultivation.
The proposed statute should therefore be twofold, increasing penalties for
major offenders while decreasing penalties for lesser offenders. Providing lower
sentences for lesser offenders should not take pressure off people who grow
thousands of plants for commercial gain while creating a public safety hazard and
243
wreaking havoc on California’s natural habitat. The trend toward numerous
large-scale operations demonstrates that the charges currently associated with
244
section 11358 are not enough to deter major offenders. The proposed statute
should therefore function to encourage smaller grows by individuals, leading to
245
decreased demand and lower marijuana prices. At the same time, the proposed
statute should block any attempt to create a safe haven for major offenders and
drug cartels by mandating higher sentences for large-scale cultivation on public
246
land. Even if the statute does not end large-scale cultivation, it should
encourage a shift to private lands, such as farmland, where environmental
degradation will play a much smaller role. The proposed statute could encourage
smaller marijuana gardens by providing a carrot—lower sentences—to lesser
offenders, while simultaneously using the stick—increasing penalties for those
who threaten California’s public safety and environmental welfare—to achieve
247
its public policy goals.
V. CULTIVATING A PROPOSED STATUTE
This Part focuses on the terms of the proposed statute. First, this Part
examines the form and function of an unrelated criminal statute: California’s
240. See Montgomery, supra note 233 (observing that California’s relaxed legal restrictions on
marijuana have contributed to a drop in the drug’s costs).
241. See McGirk, supra note 181 (discussing how Mexican drug cartels use the land in California State
Parks for covert marijuana grow sites).
242. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands, supra note 230; id. (opening Statement of Sen.
Charles E. Grassley, Co-Chairman, U.S. Sen. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control).
243. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing some of the ways that unlawful marijuana cultivation contributes
to environmental degradation).
244. 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, supra note 220.
245. See Montgomery, supra note 233 (observing that California’s relaxed legal restrictions on marijuana
have contributed to a drop in the drug’s costs).
246. Id.
247. See supra Part IV (setting forth California’s policy goals regarding marijuana cultivation).
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assault with a deadly weapon statute. The assault with a deadly weapon statute
is a wobbler, and mandates higher, felony sentences for more egregious behavior,
249
providing a useful template for the proposed statute. Then, it formulates
statutory terms to address the policy goals discussed in previous sections, as well
as statutory provisions that could be altered while still meeting certain policy
250
goals. This Part suggests that this statutory format is better-suited for dealing
with California’s unique marijuana statutory scheme and the dangers of large251
scale illegal marijuana cultivation.
A. Selecting an Appropriate Sentencing Guideline: Using Section 245 of the
Penal Code as a Model
Recent changes in marijuana law have led to a deluge of unintended
252
consequences. In amending a statute that has remained unchanged for thirty
years, it is imperative that the statute is clear in its goals, consistent with the
overall scheme of California marijuana law, is easy for police officers to
effectively apply in the field, and causes minimal confusion in the courts. This
section explores how the amended cultivation statute should be structured to
maximize its effectiveness and minimize its confusion. The form of the proposed
statute should resemble California’s assault with a deadly weapon statute because
such a structure allows the legislature to decrease penalties for lesser offenders
while requiring stricter sentences for major offenders.
California’s assault with a deadly weapon statute, section 245 of the Penal
253
Code, provides a useful model. Aggravating factors aside, section 245 deals
with assault with deadly weapons, and provides that a “person who commits an
assault . . . by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury” may
receive a misdemeanor sentence or a felony sentence of up to four years in
254
prison. A wobbler charge is available for both an assault with a firearm and an
255
assault with any other deadly instrument. From there, the number of years in
256
prison increases depending on whether certain aggravating factors are present.

248. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2007).
249. See infra Part V.A (discussing the assault with a deadly weapons statute, Section 245 of the
California Penal Code, as a model for an effective marijuana cultivation statute); see also, e.g., PENAL CODE
§ 245 (providing that the number of years that a person spends in prison for assault with a deadly weapon
increase as the egregiousness of the offense increases).
250. See infra Part V.B–C (outlining and creating the proposed statute and discussing which portions of
the proposed statute could be modified to meet specific legislative goals, such as exact quantity of marijuana).
251. See infra Part V.C (suggesting that elements such as the exact quantity and precise sentences could
be changed without seriously diminishing the usefulness of the statute).
252. Caplan, supra note 17.
253. PENAL § 245.
254. Id. § 245(a)(1).
255. Id. § 245(a)(1)–(2).
256. See generally id. § 245 (aggravating factors are based on the type of weapon used and the nature of
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Depending on a defendant’s choice of weapon or target, section 245 offers
257
anything from a misdemeanor sentence to twelve years in prison. For instance,
if the perpetrator carries out the assault with a single action revolver—as opposed
to a semiautomatic pistol—it is possible that the defendant could receive a
258
misdemeanor sentence. On the other hand, if the weapon is a semiautomatic,
the possibility for a misdemeanor evaporates, and the law requires a heftier
259
felony sentence of three, six, or nine years in prison. If the weapon is a machine
260
gun, the felony sentence jumps to four, eight, or twelve years in prison. These
graduated steps are consistent with a legislative scheme of controlling the use of
261
semiautomatic weapons and machine guns.
Other than supporting California’s gun control policy, section 245 also
262
supports a public policy of protecting emergency workers in the line of duty.
According to section 245, if defendants assault a person whom they know or
should know is a peace officer or firefighter, the sentence is three, four, or five
263
years in prison. In a combination of policy considerations, section 245 merges
the prohibited conduct to include punishments for assaulting emergency
personnel with semiautomatic weapons and machine guns, with punishments
264
reaching as far as six, nine, or twelve years. The unlawful cultivation statute
should resemble the assault with a deadly weapon statute, because this model
allows increased penalties for specific types of conduct associated with marijuana
cultivation with minimal confusion.
Rather than covering all marijuana cultivation with a blanket of higher
penalties, which would contravene the clear steps toward leniency and legality,
the legislature should amend the cultivation statute to punish major offenders
265
more severely and lesser offenders less severely. It is clear from the support for
proposed changes in AB 1017 that legislators, defense attorneys, and at least one
266
district attorney see the value in making the cultivation statute a wobbler. On
the victim. Higher penalties are imposed if the victim is a police officer or firefighter.).
257. Compare id. § 245(a)(1) (providing for a sentence in county jail), with id. § 245(d)(3) (setting forth
a sentencing scheme of six, nine, or twelve years).
258. Id. Although Section 245(a)(2) covers assault with a firearm, Section 245(b) covers assault with
semiautomatic weapons, which would not include a single-action revolver. Id. § 245(a)(2), (b).
259. Id. § 245(b).
260. Id. § 245(a)(3).
261. See id. § 30505(a) (West 2011) (“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the proliferation
and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state.”); see
also Hunter Starr, Pandora’s Lockbox: Is the Legislature Locking Guns in a Box, or Unleashing Concealed
Weapons?, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 779 (2012) (exploring California’s public policy of gun control).
262. See id. § 245(c) (discussing punishment for defendants who assault police officers or firefighters).
263. Id.
264. Id. § 245(d)(3).
265. See supra Part III.D (discussing the suitability of wobbler statutes when it comes to marijuana
cultivators).
266. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal.
May 3, 2011); see also Letter from C. David Eyster, supra note 136 (asserting the Mendocino County District
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the other hand, it is clear from CAMP, the California District Attorneys
Association, and from an environmental standpoint, that there are specific kinds
of criminal behaviors associated with marijuana cultivation that should not be
267
eligible for lowered sentences.
B. The Proposed Statute
This Comment proposes a model marijuana cultivation statute that would
increase penalties for specific types of conduct associated with marijuana
cultivation while minimizing the resulting confusion. The first section of the
unlawful marijuana cultivation statute should remain the same as the current
268
statute. Using the historical statutory language, with the addition of wobbler
269
language, would minimize confusion. Thus, a multipart cultivation statute
would begin as section 11358(a) of the California Health and Safety Code:
“Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any marijuana
or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or
270
pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170 of the Penal Code.”
The second section of the amended cultivation statute should concentrate on
these public policy concerns: deterring large illegal operations, deterring the use
of public land, deterring damage to public land, and deterring danger to the
271
public. Considering that large-scale grow operations present a more lucrative
opportunity to anyone who would use violence to obtain or protect the plants and
that large-scale operations often take place on public lands, cultivation of a large
number of plants increases the probability and extent of violent crime and
272
environmental degradation. Thus, the second section of the new statute should
273
increase penalties for cultivation of a larger number of plants.

Attorney C. David Eyster’s support for AB 1017).
267. Id.; see also supra Part IV.A–B (discussing the environmental implications of marijuana cultivation
on public land and CAMP’s efforts to reduce that activity).
268. “Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any marijuana or any part
thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170 of the Penal Code.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013).
269. See supra Part II.C (noting that more recent cases interpreting the statute focus on the statute’s
construction with the CUA, rather than the meaning of the statute itself).
270. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358.
271. See supra Part IV.A (discussing all of these social issues).
272. Id.
273. The problem with a statutory attack on large cultivation sites is that the California Supreme Court
has already held that a legal limit on the number of plants one may possess is an unconstitutional check on the
will of the voters as it is applied to the CUA. California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010). On the other
hand, because the CUA is an affirmative defense that can still be employed, and the amendment would not seek
to limit the number of plants that could be claimed under the CUA, a higher sentence for a larger number of
plants should be relatively safe from a constitutional challenge. See id. (holding that the provision of the
Medical Marijuana Program limiting quantities of marijuana were only unconstitutional as applied to the CUA).
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In numerous grow operations shut down by CAMP, there have been
thousands of marijuana plants at each major site, whether on public or private
274
land. Because large grows on public and private land can lead to violence and
environmental degradation, the initial penalty increase should apply to both
public and private land. The statutory number of plants should appeal to the
common sense of voters and stay out of the reach of the CUA defense as
275
276
applied : for instance, five-hundred plants, mature or otherwise. Due to the
277
recent confusion regarding dispensaries, the proposed statute should not raise
the sentence too high for even this large number of plants. Section 11358(b)
should read: “every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana
plants, regardless of the maturity of the plants, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to section 1170(h) of the Penal
Code.” As such, organizations like the California District Attorneys Association
can rest easy knowing that large-scale operations will still be punishable as a
felony, while still preserving felony time in a county jail as a sentencing option.
The third section of the statute should address the public hazard of
278
cultivation on public lands. As discussed above, growth on public lands raises
concerns simply not associated with growth on private lands, such as destruction
of wildlife, increases chances of wildfires, and contamination of natural water
279
sources. As was the case in section 245 of the Penal Code, and because large
plantations are particularly detrimental to public lands, the punishment for the
number of plants should be joined with the public hazards of violence and
280
environmental degradation. Thus, section 11358(c) would read: “every person

274. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, available at http://w3.calema.
ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/PDF/Campaign%20Against%20Marijuana%20Planting%20Program%20(CA
MP)/$file/CAMP%20%20OK%20JO%20AM.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that in 2009, CAMP conducted 665 raids and seized over four-million plants).
275. See California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (holding that to the extent that the MMPA
put a limit on the number of plants that could be grown under the protection of the CUA, it was
unconstitutional). While the CUA does not place a limit on the number of plants that may be grown by a person,
the MMP provides useful insight as to the number of plants that would be required by a seriously ill person.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77 (West 2007). The proposed should avoid the appearance of
unconstitutionally amending the CUA.
276. According to Section 841 of title 21 of the United States Code, possession of one-thousand plants
with the intent to distribute them can result in a sentence of “imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years
or more than life.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006). If the number of plants reaches one-thousand, then federal
prosecutors can prosecute for a much higher sentence. Id. This way, California authorities can prosecute largescale cultivators that fall slightly short of this federal requirement. See id. (requiring one-thousand plants for
federal prosecution, which might conflict with state jurisdiction if the proposed state statute uses the same
minimum quantity).
277. E.g., Lindberg, supra note 64, at 59.
278. E.g., Jessica Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 227 (2009) (stating that large-scale marijuana
operations damage the environment and that cultivation on public land is becoming more prevalent).
279. See Part IV.A (exploring the various ways that cultivation on public lands destroys natural habitat
and wildlife).
280. Id.
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who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants, regardless of the maturity
of the plants, in a place that the person knew was public land, or reasonably
should have known was public land, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for two, three, or four years.”
Because large-scale cultivators have grown far more than five-hundred
281
plants, the statute should offer a higher sentence for extremely large numbers of
282
plants. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, the statute should place a hefty cost on
those seeking to reap substantial illegal gains. Thus, the statute should offer an
even higher sentence for cultivators of one-thousand or more plants, such as a
sentence of three, four, or five years. This system of sentencing enhancements by
283
quantity of illegal drugs is consistent with other aspects of California drug law.
Section 11358(d) would read: “Every person who cultivates one-thousand or
more marijuana plants, in a place that the person knew was public land, or
reasonably should have known was public land, regardless of the maturity of the
plants, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or
five years.”
Overall, this proposed enhancement scheme would be consistent with the
increased environmental damage that larger cultivation operations will inevitably
cause. A graduated sentencing scheme will also raise potential cost with
284
increased benefit, thereby lessening the incentives for growers. It will also
protect California from environmental degradation while protecting the public
from the public safety hazards of armed cultivators on public lands.
This Comment proposes the following language for a new marijuana
cultivation statute:
(a) Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any
marijuana or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by law,
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than
one year or in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h) of
section 1170 of the Penal Code.
(b) Every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants
on private land, regardless of the maturity of the plants, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to section
1170(h) of the Penal Code.

281. E.g., More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., supra note 177 (discussing a single raid
that turned up more than five-thousand plants).
282. E.g., Landsburg, supra note 102 (stating that criminals weigh the potential cost of crime with the
potential benefits that they may reap from the crime).
283. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.4 (West 2007) (raising the penalties incrementally with
the amount of specified drugs).
284. See supra Part IV.B (describing how the current economic trends have led to increased production
in order to reap the same profits).
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(c) Every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants,
in a place that the person knew was public land, or reasonably should
have known was public land, regardless of the maturity of the plants,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three,
or four years.
(d) Every person who cultivates one-thousand or more marijuana plants,
regardless of the maturity of the plants, in a place that the person
knew was public land, or reasonably should have known was public
land, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years.
This proposed statute would therefore take into account both the scale of the
illegal cultivation and its location, offering a misdemeanor charge to lesser
offenders, while requiring minimum sentences for cultivators who threaten public
safety and contaminate California’s environment. The proposed statute should
therefore facilitate a shift from large-scale cultivation to small-scale cultivation
and from cultivation on public land to cultivation on private land.
C. What Elements Could Be Changed
There are several elements of the proposed statute that are approximations
based on public policy goals. For instance, the numbers five-hundred and one285
thousand in the second and third subparts have no intrinsic significance, but
286
represents a definite limit that was exceeded in the raids that CAMP conducted.
Mandating a specific number would help avoid any accusation that prosecutors
were abusing their discretion, as there would be a mandatory minimum. On the
other hand, it would then be possible for large-scale cultivators to plant just under
five-hundred plants and avoid higher penalties. It is within the discretion of the
legislature to determine whether five-hundred should be the limit or some other
number, but the number should be high and definite.
The legislature also has the discretion to define what constitutes public land.
For instance, the legislature may determine that certain types of public land may
be punishable by higher penalties or lower penalties, such as public camp
grounds, state parks, or municipal land. As an example, in more remote areas,
environmental degradation may be the main concern, while in others public
safety may play a larger role. Thus, the proposed statute may single out specific
areas with numerous tourists as well as wildlife that could receive greater
protection, such as Yosemite National Park. While there is room for discussion,

285. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (requiring at least one-thousand plants to prosecute).
286. E.g., More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., supra note 177 (discussing a single raid
that turned up more than five-thousand plants).
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the fact remains that the inflexibility of the unlawful cultivation statute does not
reflect public opinion or legislative policy and it must be changed.
VI. CONCLUSION
California’s marijuana laws have been trending toward lenience since the
287
CUA in 1996. Changing the cultivation statute to reflect this shift is the next
step. At the same time, this Comment recognizes that California has been the site
of rampant large-scale marijuana cultivation that has led to public safety hazards,
degradation of the environment, and large expenditures in public tax money to
regulate unlawful cultivation.
The new statute employs a “carrot and stick” approach to marijuana law. By
turning the cultivation statute into a wobbler, the state can offer lesser offenders a
“carrot”—a guaranteed lower sentence. The result will be some combination of
deterring unlawful cultivation through increased chances of successful
prosecution and raising the effectiveness of conviction through plea bargains in
cultivation cases. The “stick” of higher penalties for larger plantations and
cultivating on public lands will result in some combination of deterring
cultivators from planting large cultivation sites and deterring cultivators from
using public lands. On balance, a wobbler cultivation statute with internal
enhancements for major offenders will increase the number of successful
marijuana cultivation prosecutions, contain public disappointment with the
justice system, reduce the cost of large-scale marijuana eradication efforts, and
protect California’s environment.

287. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (West 2007).
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